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True Relativism, Interpretation
and Our Reasons for Action
BARRY C. SMITH
Can there be a subject matter of genuine dispute between two
participants where neither side has overlooked any relevant fact, where
neither side has made a mistake and where both claim to be getting
matters right? Would such a case, in effect, amount to saying that there
is no fact of the matter and that the parties must agree to differ, or
could it ever be correct to say that they were both right? The issue for
this paper is whether such a possibility makes sense and whether there
are any real such cases. Recently, Crispin Wright has attempted to
make room for such possibilities, calling the ensuing doctrine, True
Relativism (Wright 2001, 2004). According to Wright, if there are
disputes where neither side is in error, cognitively speaking, then it may
be correct to say that the truth of the matter is relative to, and the facts
partly constituted by, each participant’s starting point or perspective.
Are there any plausible cases of such disputes? In what follows I offer
what appears to be the best candidate, to be found, somewhat
surprisingly, in the work of Donald Davidson (— someone usually taken
to be the chief opponent of relativism). It involves a plausible case
where there are two equally adequate rival interpretations of an agent’s
mental states, no grounds for choosing between them, and no reason
for saying either is mistaken. But before we look at that case let us
consider the issue more generally.
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1. Grounds for Disagreement
Candidates for the sort of disputes we are interested in may occur
where there are questions of taste, ethical discourses, aesthetic
judgements, philosophical disagreements, and even scientific theorising.
Some, but not all of these candidates can be quickly discounted and it is
perhaps unlikely that any single treatment would apply to all such cases
equally well. In matters of taste, however, things may seem more
straightforward. So let us start with such a case.
When turning our attention to fine wines, I may favour Burgundy
while you favour the wines from the Rhone. I claim the greatest wines
of Burgundy to be superior to the greatest Rhone wines and you beg to
differ1. In this case it may be tempting, at first, to say that each of us
fails to recognise some particular characteristic or quality of the wines
noted and attended to by the other. But let us build into the case the
assumption that we are both experienced wine critics, fully apprised of
what is at stake and as fully informed as you like about the nature,
merits, characteristics, faults and virtues of the best samples of each
region’s wines. As acknowledged experts in the field, we are able to
recognize the excellence and typicity of various samples of Burgundy
and Rhone, and we may both be able to adjudicate between greater and
lesser vintages. And yet, at the end of all our scrutiny, your preference is
for a Beaucastel Chateauneuf du Pape over a Leroy Chambertin, and I
cannot understand how you can think that. At this point it is right for
you to judge that the Chateuaneuf is better than the Chambertin; while
from my point of view it is right for me to judge the Chambertin vastly
superior. Should we say that you and I are in genuine disagreement
about the same subject matter: the comparative qualities of the two
wines? Or should we instead say that you are reflecting how you
evaluate matters given your palate and preferences, and I am reporting
how I evaluate things given mine. If we say the latter, no sense of a
potentially intractable dispute about the same matter appears to be in
the offing. Surely, we are not judging objective matters of fact here but
comparing subjective responses, and as such we should agree to differ;
even though those differences will, at times, lead to real conflicts of
interest or choice. Still, I will have learned something about your
subjective preferences, and you will have learned something about
1 With one or two further elaborations, the case parallels Wright’s rhubarb case. I find the
wine example more congenial and the stakes are higher.
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mine. I will also have learned not to let you choose from the wine list at
dinner.
However, things are not quite so simple as they seem. As wine critics
we are not merely reporting on our own subjective experiences —
entertaining to each of us as that may be — we are trying to assess the
respective merits and qualities of the wines. We may base our
judgements on the subjective experiences of tasting but in doing so we
aim to go beyond those experiences to the properties of the wines
themselves. Similarly, when we express our preferences for one wine
over another we are prepared to offer reasons for our preferences. We
are not just responding subjectively, we are offering reasoned appraisals.
You will speak about the complexity of many component tastes
harmonised and balanced in the Chateauneuf. I will speak of the
restraint and elegance with which Leroy combines power and finesse in
the Chambertin.
So although we may want to deny that we are dealing with a wholly
objective matter, there is room here for a genuine conflict in judgement
between the two tasters. Each taster makes a judgement about the
comparative standing of the two wines based first of all on a subjective
experience of the pleasure each wine affords him. The difference in
subjective experiences would not be enough to generate anything that
appeared to be a genuine disagreement. But a potential conflict in
judgement is generated when each taster moves from his or her own
subjective experience to the supposition that the pleasures caused in
him by the wines are features of the wines themselves: features thereby
available to others. I take myself to be speaking not about how things
are not (just) with me but with the Chambertin and the Chateauneuf
du Pape. Have I made a mistake in what I am really talking about?
Again, the diagnosis is not so simple. To claim that the wines
themselves have the qualities I take myself to detect, I am really making
a claim about what others can expect to experience in tasting those
wines. I am implicitly moving from how things are with me to how they
are for anyone suitably discriminating enough to judge wines.
Certainly, I may express the latter claim as if it were a more neutral,
experience-independent claim about the wine, not recognising how that
claim should or must be understood. The objectivity there is here can be
construed along the lines Kant drew in the Critque of Judgement. The
experience of pleasure I enjoy in tasting the wines lays claim to a similar
response in all discriminating wine tasters. The idea that what is
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immeasurably better about the taste of the Chambertin in my
experience, will be common to all is what that puts me in direct conflict
with a similar thought in you, mutatis mutandis, about the superior
pleasures of the Chateauneuf du Pape. There is scope here for genuine
disagreement between the parties, and not just clash of responses, once
each goes beyond their preferences to would-be objective claims about
the wines themselves, or at any rate their inter-subjectively available
effects on tasters. It is equally clear, in this case, that while both parties
cannot be right, both parties can be wrong. Genuine disagreement is
preserved but we can no longer cling to the idea that neither side to the
dispute has made any error, or that the dispute is intractable — the
point at which appeals to relativism are made.2 Both parties to the
dispute go wrong, albeit in understandable ways, in moving from their
own experience to an all-embracing conclusions about everyone else’s
experience — conclusions they will be committed to in making in claims
to be in touch with facts available to all discriminating tasters about the
comparative merits of the wines.
Of course there is another move to make here, more congenial, it may
seem, to Wright. We could say that both critics are right and that each
is apprised of the facts of the comparative merits of the wines from his
standpoint. How are we to make sense of such a suggestion? Well, it is
quite likely that there are distinct populations of discerning tasters, each
of whom will go along with one or another of our judges on this matter,
depending on their own affective or qualitative response to certain
flavours. The truth of which wine is better would be relative to given
populations of tasters but the sense of an intractable dispute between
our original two parties would surely vanish once this possibility was
pointed out. Some favour one style of wine, some favour the other. In
what sense, then, could either taster continue to regard his opponent as
mistaken?
In cases like these, a satisfactory diagnosis of what is going on shows
each party to be making a Kantian move from their own experience of
pleasure to something that lays claim to facts about similar responses
and appreciation by others. In tasting wine I take myself, at the same
time, to be entitled to claims about you and anybody else suitably
2 In another but similar context, Bernard Williams makes the apt remark: ‘Relativism, of
any kind, does its work when it looks as though there is conflict, and it may be said that
there is no work for it to do here, because there does not even seem to be a conflict.’
(Williams 2002, p259)
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equipped to judge. The judgments I take myself to be making about a
wine in each case are hostage to whether or not I am entitled to the
Kantian move. I can get matters wrong. In particular, not to be aware
of different populations of tasters with different thresholds for
experiencing sweet or sour, salty or bitter, or relational properties
defined over these, leaves me open to error in my expectation of
agreement. To that extent I have made a cognitive mistake. Again, the
case does not support Wright’s true relativist requirements of a genuine
dispute in which each party is cognitively blameless.
It is worth taking time here to appreciate where disagreement does
and does not lie and how the participants’ views of their disagreements
can fail to locate the source of conflict and can give rise to the
impression of an intractable dispute.
What is being envisaged here is that each participant through his or
her experience of pleasure lays claim to, and calls upon, the responses
and experiences of others. The truth of the universal claim is answerable
to whether or not the Kantian manoeuvre is sustainable. But from the
participants’ point of view things may appear otherwise. I make a
judgement about the standing of the wines based on a subjective
experience of pleasure — albeit informed by recollection and past
experience as a taster — but from that point I am implicitly calling upon
and relying on the consent of others in having the pleasure and
preferences I do. I base my judgement on a subjective experience of
pleasure and take it to afford me knowledge of the wine itself. What I
perhaps fail to recognise is that I am implicitly supposing the Leroy
Chambertin will be the most hedonistic and pleasurable wine for both
of us. It may not be obvious to me, that I am implicitly inviting the
agreement of you and others, and making the judgement is such a way
as to take into account or invite your agreement. That is, I do not
distinguish the claim that the Chambertin is the most hedonistic and
pleasurable of wines from the more restrained claim that it is the most
hedonistic and pleasurable for me. The slide from how things are with
me to how they are in the object of my experience is a common move
and at times an innocent one. But the only way to make sense of this
transition in the case of tasting is to see me as extending my judgement
by implicitly supposing these qualities will be judged similarly by all
subjects (suitably placed to judge). I take myself as a litmus test for the
qualities I claim to be detecting in the wine and thereby invite others to
confirm these qualities by detecting the same qualities in their glass. I
expect the effect of pleasure the wine causes in me to be equally
True Relativism, Interpretation and Our Reasons for Action
76
available to you and with a strength that confirms for you that Le
Chambertin outweighs the pleasure of (or caused by) the Chateauneuf
du Pape. In tasting and enjoying a singular experience of mine aimed at
the wine I am, unknowingly, attempting to take into account others’
experiences. But the judgement by me that this wine is superior stands
or falls with the judgement that the wine is superior to the Chateauneuf
for all, and that is why it can be mistaken.
If you are making judgments of a similar form based on your
experience of pleasure, our judgements will collide, but not where we
think they do. Although we take ourselves to be making simpler
judgements about the wines themselves sense can be made of this
option, and thus of there being genuine grounds for dispute, only in so
far as we are thereby making judgements about how anyone will
experience wine. It is only in doing so that we come into conflict of a
traceable and resolvable kind. Could there be a right or wrong
judgement about the wines themselves? Certainly, and in some cases
the Kantian move is valid for all discerning tasters. Can we ever say
both tasters are right? Yes, but only about different populations of
tasters who divide along the greatest Burgundy – greatest Rhone axis,
and therefore they will not be in dispute about the very same claim, and
it will take work to disentangle the real but divergent subject matters of
their judgements. In such cases we will have a fairly innocuous,
indexical relatvism. Without such disentangling there will be scope for
genuine dispute but there will also be room for one or another or both
making a mistake. Our judgements will clash whether or not there is
something to get right or wrong about the qualities of the wines
themselves. In such cases, my saying that the Chambertin is the most
delicious wine, should be construed as the claim that:
 (Me) (Everyone suitably placed to judge will find) The Chambertin
is most delicious wine.
You, in making the claim that the Chateauneuf is the preferable wine,
should be understood as claiming that:
(You) (Everyone suitably placed to judge will find ) The Chateauneuf
is the most delicious wine.
Clearly, the judgements made by (Me) and (You) are in tension, even
though the simpler embedded statements, unqualified may or may not
lend themselves to genuine disagreement. The judgements of both
parties are wrong, but not about the simpler statements, whatever truth
values they do, nor do not, have. We can be genuinely mistaken when
making claims about wines, when for each of us, these judgements,
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grounded in our subjective experiences, implicitly make claims about
others’ experiences. In aiming to make claims about the wines we are
bound to incur the claims (Me) and (You) about what people in the
right conditions internally and externally will find in the wines they
taste. These claims are being advanced even though we only take
ourselves to be making the simpler judgements about the wines
themselves. It is hard at first to see that that is what is happening when
we make the initial pronouncements. Subjects themselves will not
detect a gap between their judgements about a wine’s taste and the
qualities of the wine itself (although they knows they are fallible under
certain conditions that constitute interference factors.) Plus, the
ambition in judging is to get things right, to get at the truth of the
matter. However, they will seldom if ever recognise that the claims they
are making about the wines are implicitly claims about others’
experiences in tasting them. Can someone judging a wine be in
possession of a truth, then? Yes, but not necessarily the one he or she
thinks he is in possession of. On some occasions we can say that the two
tasters are judging a proposition with the same content, in other cases
we cannot. It all depends on whether there is a single populations of
tasters whose opinions converge or not; on whether we are entitled to
the Kantian move or not.
Other disputes, however, are not so easy to diagnose or resolve. And
it is the persistent and troubling cases I want to explore more in this
paper. If the treatment of the wine case shows how we can preserve
genuine disagreement without countenancing the true relativism
Wright espouses, we can nonetheless point to other, more troubling
and intractable disputes which do seem to take on the pattern Wright
describes. Ethical cases come to mind. But before commenting on them
I shall now lay out what I think provides the most plausible candidate
in Wright’s favour: namely, indeterminacy in the case of the rational
interpretation of minds and motives of human agents on the basis of
their linguistic and other behaviour.
2. Interpreting Behaviour
For Donald Davidson, what we know about the mind of a human agent
is brought to light by our interpreting the agent’s behaviour in rational
terms. This is not simply a useful method for getting at the facts of
another’s mental life: meeting the conditions of interpretability is
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constitutive of what it is to be minded in the first place.3 A creature’s
movements and mouthings can be construed as rational acts once we
see them as based on the creature’s reasons for acting, reasons given in
terms of the antecedent beliefs and desires that make sense of that
person doing and saying what they do and say. Interpretations given in
terms of these intentional notions have to meet the constraints of
rationality and charity. The rationality constraint insists there will be
ways of making sense of someone that gives better service in
interpreting his mental states and actions than others: the correct
interpretation will be the one that make him more not less rational in
what he does, believes and desires. Meanwhile, charitable
interpretations will be those which credit him with credible beliefs
about his surroundings: beliefs about his current circumstances that are
largely true by the interpreter’s lights.
We are each interpreters of one another, and in making sense of
other people we rely on what makes sense to us. We see others as
rational in so far as the means we have for making sense are themselves
rational, and recognisably so by others. We try to ascribe people
sensible and not outlandish beliefs as far as we can, supposing them to
believe what we do about the prevailing circumstances. Thus in making
sense of others we will be operating in accordance with the constraints
of rationality and charity even though we may not be conscious of
doing so. We are not theorists of interpretation but just ordinary
interpreters. Theorists of interpretation are those who makes explicit
our ordinary methods for interpreting one another, and make precise
what we are justified in ascribing to others on the basis of available
evidence. In this way, the theorist of interpretation provides an account
of what the ordinary interpreter can know on the basis of the
observable evidence. That interpretations can be given consistent with
the principles of rationality and charity that make sense of a creature’s
behaviour is, according to Davidson, what makes it possible to regard
the creature as a thinker in the first place. Only someone who meets the
standards for rational interpretation, someone whose behaviour is
found explicable by an interpreter using these methods, counts as
minded. Thus what is is to have a particular belief or desire is to be apt
to be ascribed that belief or that desire in the course of providing an
interpretation that makes best sense possible of the agent’s total life and
conduct. As Davidson puts it:
3 The classic source of Davidson’s views is his Essays on Actions and Events (OUP 1980).
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We know what states of mind are like, and how they are correctly
identified; they are just those states whose contents can be discovered
in well-known ways. If other people or creatures are in states not
discoverable by these methods, it cannot be because our methods fail
us, but because those states are not correctly called states of mind —
they are not beliefs, desires, wishes or intentions. (‘The Myth of the
Subjective’ 2001 p.40)
And for Davidson mental states are not really entities: ‘we should
simply talk of people having attitudes, which means that certain
predicates are true of them’. (‘Indeterminism and Antirealism’ 2001
p.82). Another way he likes to puts the point is to say that events are
mental only as described.4 Therefore the methods of interpretation are
crucial to the mental realm. The mental is vindicated by the intentional
categories and concepts we devised to explain our own and others
behaviour in rational terms; and the domain of the mental is
constituted and exhausted by the principles of rationality and charity as
they govern the interpreter’s attribution of attitudes and meanings to
explain agents’ actions and utterances. As Davidson says:
What a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker
means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the speaker
believes. (‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, p.148)
3. Indeterminacy in Interpretations of the Mental
So what then should we say if faced with the possibility of two or more
equally plausible ways to make sense of an agent’s actions and
utterances, each of which comports with the behavioural facts, the
methods of interpretation, the principles of rationality and charity? We
face such situations where we have episodes in a person’s physical
history that are readily understood as deliberate actions but where the
identification of them as the acts they are — the descriptions under
which they are intentional — depend on the motives attributed to the
agent for so acting. At this point there may be more than one fully
cogent, plausible story that makes sense of the agent that is fully
consistent with everything else he says and does. The two
interpretations may diverge at some crucial juncture on the agent’s
reasons for performing a particular act. At just such a juncture there
may be non-empirical reasons for one interpreter, or group of
4 See ‘Mental Events’ p.211 in Davidson 1980.
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interpreters to favour one account and for another interpreter, or group
of interpreters to favour the other. The question is how we should
respond to the idea that the mental life of an agent is constituted and
exhausted by what can be said about him in terms of rationality and
charity, and given the facts about his behaviour, when there are at least
two rival interpretations with equal claim to correctness. Let’s consider
a particular case.
In 1941, the German physicist, Werner Heisenberg, who was by then
working for the Nazis, went to occupied Denmark to visit his old friend
and teacher, the atomic physicist Niels Bohr. This much is known.
Heisenberg’s motives for going to Copenhagen to see Bohr are much
less clear. Was he trying to find out what the Allies knew about nuclear
fission, or was he trying to persuade Bohr to join him in seeking to
prevent the development of the atomic bomb? Was he keen to impress
his old teacher and rival, or was he seeking some form of absolution
from Bohr for his involvement in such research? It is unclear. Bohr and
Heisenberg disagreed about what was really going on. Heisenberg
himself may have been far from clear about what he was up to.
In any event the question of why he went to Copenhagen — a risky
things to do at the time — is a question about his motives for acting. A
dramatised version of these events is presented by Michael Frayn in his
play Cophenhagen, In the play, Frayn has the characters of Heisenberg,
Bohr and Bohr’s wife Margrethe, explore different interpretations of
what Heisenberg was up to. It is clear that Heisenberg was always
impulsive and decisive. Unlike Bohr, he acted without much reflection
on his reasons for doing so. This makes it plausible for Heisenberg,
despite what self-knowledge he has, to be concerned to make sense of
his motives for visiting Bohr, and is prepared along with the others to
consider alternative interpretations of his actions.
During the visit, Heisenberg and Bohr talked in the woods to avoid
surveillance. It was there that Heisenberg broached with Bohr the
difficult issue of nuclear fission. When they returned to the house from
the walk in the woods their friendship was over. The play focuses on
this incident and the events surrounding it and asks why Heisenberg
came to Copenhagen. Forget what we now know, or may subsequently
find out, about the actual meeting of these two men. The play is
skilfully crafted in such a way as to remain equally poised between
plausible versions of Heisenberg’s character and history.
Without describing the play in detail let us take it for granted that it
offers us a plausible case of rival interpretations of an agent’s actions,
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where each interpretation is equally compatible with the totality of
evidence about the agent’s behaviour but where each offers different
reasons for what the agent says and does.5 Without anything in the
available facts to decide between the two interpretations — one
according to which Heisenberg was culpable of seeking to elicit secret
information from the Allies about their atomic programme, and
another according to which he was somewhat naïve — we seem to be
faced with an indeterminacy of interpretation. The question is what
should the Davidsonian say about this case? 6
In ‘Indeterminacy and Antirealism’, Davidson countenances the
possibility of indeterminacies of interpretation that go beyond the
inscrutability of reference:
Not all cases of indeterminacy depend on the possibility of
systematically altering the satisfaction relation in ways that do not
affect the truth values of sentences; there can be indeterminacies that
affect truth values. (‘Indeterminacy and Antirealism’, p.80)
In particular, there can be different interpretations of, say, Heisenberg’s
reasons for acting — i.e. different descriptions of the actions he is
performing — which ascribe to him different motives for visiting Bohr.
There will be further differences between the interpretations due to the
holistic character of the network of intentional attitudes and actions
that make up a single overall interpretation:
…by making compensating adjustments elsewhere in one’s
interpretation of [his] sentences and beliefs one can accommodate
either story. (ibid. p.80)
On one account of Heisenberg’s character, some of his pronouncements
will be false, on the other account the same pronouncements will be
true. Now what should Davidson say about the possibility of two
equally empirically adequate way of construing Heisenberg’s motives?
What he should say is one thing, what he does say is another. Rejecting
Quine’s view of indeterminacy as a matter of empirically equivalent but
incompatible theories, Davidson says:
5 Those who wish further details can consult the text, Copenhagen, published by Methuen
Drama Publishing Ltd.
6 Davidson saw the play in London and much admired it, remarking that he felt it
contained something deep.
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Indeterminacy is not like this: the empirically equivalent theories it
accepts as equally good for understanding an agent are not
incompatible, any more than the measurement of weight in pounds
or kilos involves incompatible theories of weight. (ibid. p.76)
This can’t be quite right since the rival interpretations are at least
incompatible in the truth values they assign to particular sentences —
albeit under different interpretations. And it is quite possible for one
and the same interpreter, using the same background language, to
consider and reject one interpretation in favour of another that
disagrees with it with respect to the particular attributions of belief and
desire it makes to the agent. However, in calling the empirically
equivalent theories ‘equally good for understanding an agent’ Davidson
may be suggesting that each provides a perfectly adequate way of
making sense of the agent. But he could, and probably is, suggesting
more than this: namely, that either interpretation will do and we need
not chose between them. Hence the analogy he gives with measuring
weight in pounds or kilos. But this is not quite right for the case of
Heisenberg. It is not all the same whether we see him as morally
culpable or not. Very different consequences flow from adopting one
stand or another towards him, and we cannot minimise these
differences as Davidson’s analogy suggests. Interpreters who took up
radically different moral stances towards Heisenberg after the war could
not simply be talked into accepting that they should happily accept one
or the other interpretation since there was nothing to chose between
them on evidential grounds. Their persistence in thinking that either
one or other of them must be right about Heisenberg’s real motive in
acting as did may give rise to an intractable dispute and a certain
realism about mental may be the best way to understand that dispute.
For the right things to say may be that there is a fact of the matter
about what really propelled Heisenberg to come to Copenhagen — a
fact that interpretation alone cannot elicit. This would make the case
one of underdetermination of theory by evidence, not indeterminacy.
To accept this diagnosis would be to reject Davidson’s interpretationist
view of the mental. So a particular reaction to the Heisenberg case
could be used as an ad hominem argument against Davidson’s views. But
supposing that it is not see easy to make sense of the alternative, realist
view of mental states in which beliefs or desires are there in the agent
but forever unknowable, what should the Davidsonian say about this
case?
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It would seem to be at odds with Davidson’s own picture to suppose
that it made no difference to suppose Heisenberg was acting on ulterior
motives or more favourable ones. After all, for Davidson, reasons are
causes, and these reasons are quite different. Something caused him to
come to Copenhagen, it was a deliberate act, and even if he is not very
self-knowing, it seems right to suppose that we can get at the only
plausible stories, compatible with everything else in his history. The two
proposals about his reasons for acting are not interchangeable, and only
one of them was the cause of his action. But we have no way to favour
one over another: there are just two overall interpretations, each with
its supporters who cling tenaciously to their account. Is this then a
candidate for Wright’s true relativism? Bernard Williams would
perhaps have resisted the idea:
Relativity in what makes sense to some people and not to others isn’t
necessarily relativity of truth. (Truth and Truthfulness, p. 258)
What is relative is the interest that selectively forms a narrative and
puts some part of the past into shape. (ibid. p.259)
But when we are dealing with total interpretations that makes sense of
an agent’s behaviour to some people on one interpretation and reveal
facets of the agent’s character, motives, beliefs, desires and intentions;
and with what makes sense to other people in terms of a quite different
set of motives and intentions based on another interpretation, shouldn’t
we say that the truth is relative to the interpretation, or to the moral
and psychological outlook of the interpreters?
In Wright’s True Relativist framework the diagnosis would be as
follows. The two interpreters are in genuine disagreement about
Heisenberg’s motives for visiting Bohr. Their respective views of the
matter are incompatible. Each is warranted in promoting the
interpretation he or she favours on the evidential grounds and by appeal
to the principles of interpretation. Their disagreement is faultless.
Neither side has making a cognitive mistake. But their adoption of one
interpretation rather than the other may be based on non-cognitivist
(emotivist?) attitudes towards Heisenberg. Neither of their accounts
can be defeated but neither is prepared to give way. The dispute is
sustainable, faultless and genuine, and ironically, relativism about truth
may be the only option for the Davidsonian who propounds an
interpretationist view of the mental. On such a view, it may be non-
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cognitivist attitudes or outlooks that lead an interpreter to select, as
Williams puts it, one well-supported narrative over another.
4. A Last  Word About Morals
It may be useful to consider what lessons could be learned in the moral
cases from the sort of treatment envisaged here for the psychological,
assuming such a framework can be made out. An important case for
consideration is that of abortion. In that fraught debate it is hard to
believe that the passionate advocates on each side are missing some
crucial consideration of the other side’s, which were they to see it,
would convince them to change their minds. Both sides in this
seemingly intractable dispute are only too aware of the battery of
arguments their opponents wields to make out their case. Each side has
been rehearsing these considerations in public debates for many years.
What appears to be at issue is not cognitive blame on one side or
another, or both, but a very different way in which each side weighs the
considerations that are adduced, Perhaps each side places different
weight on the values that are commonly recognised to be in play.
However, another option advocated by Ronald Dworkin and others is
that each side goes in for different interpretations of the values under
consideration. This may lead us to suppose that they are not really
contradicting one another, that they have subtly different propositional
claims in play. However, if the foregoing remarks about interpretation
can be carried over to this case too, there may be no easy way to
dispense with an ensuing relativism in moral disputes.7
7 My thanks to Guy Longworth and Greg Sherkoske for discussion of these issues.
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